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Summary: After four years of ambivalence, the relationship between the European 
Union and Serbia is again gaining a new opportunity to flourish. The new Serbian 
government is formed by parties which are strongly committed to Serbia’s EU 
integration and hence ready to carry out reforms and fully cooperate with the 
International Crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This paper presents the current 
relationship between Brussels and Belgrade and its main obstacles. It emphasizes both 
internal and external problems of this relationship and their interdependency. In this 
regard the author argues that only by a mutual commitment of both Serbia and the EU 
lasting peace will be achieved in the Western Balkans and the region stabilized. 
 
Key words: Serbia, European Union, EU Integration 
 




Compared to other Central and South East European countries (CEEC and 
SEEC), which since 1989 had a determined orientation toward the European 
Union (EU), Serbia maintained a rather unique relationship to Brussels during 
the previous two decades. The state of their relationship ranged from direct 
confrontation and rejections to strong cooperation and enthusiasm. Total slow-
downs (another noun?) were even experienced on occasion.
1 Following the 
outbreak of hostilities in former Yugoslavia, the Serbian president Milošević 
entered into a direct confrontation with the EU. The following years saw the EU 
introducing a number of measures, beginning with partial and full sanctions, 
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followed by a variety of “carrot and stick”-proposals
2 None of these actions 
succeeded in pacifying and stabilizing the region, Serbia in particular. As a 
result, their mutual relationship degraded to its lowest point in history during the 
years 1990 and 2000. During this period, Serbia was isolated and hence held no 
status in the EU integration process; moreover, the nation was exposed to EU 
sanctions. This policy changed after Slobodan Milošević was dismissed from 
power. Later than any other former Yugoslav republic, Serbia began its EU 
integration process in 2001. This took place following the first democratic 
parliamentary elections held in December 2000. 
 
 
2. Background and Current State of Affairs 
 
Background. The removal of Slobodan Milošević set free a wave of enthusiasm 
throughout the SEE region. In Serbia the first elected democratic Serbian 
government demonstrated a clear commitment to EU integration. 
Synchronously, a readiness to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was evinced concurrent with an effort to 
(re)build positive relationships with neighbouring countries. The changes within 
Serbia created a spill over effect, especially in its fellow former Yugoslav 
republics. Heretofore these countries were blocked to some extent in their 
development. This, as well as their difficulty in the EU integration process had 
been due to the geographical, political and economic interdependency among the 
Balkan countries. The enthusiasm ultimately reached the international 
community. The EU, which was both satisfied and relieved by the democratic 
and peaceful change in Serbia, rapidly proclaimed a new perspective for all 
SEEC. This position was first announced in the final declaration of the Zagreb 
Summit of November 24, 2000, yet it did not become tangible before the 
Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans in June 2003. 
By the time the EU had decided to make a stronger commitment in 
Thessaloniki the enthusiasm in Serbia had dwindled. The first democratic 
government, a coalition of 18 parties led by Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, was 
facing major difficulties in agreeing upon and gaining wider support for an 
unconditional commitment to the EU integration process. This proposition 
included a full cooperation with the ICTY. At the same time, the EU showed 
little sensitivity for the battle the pro-European parties were forced to wage 
within the coalition. While keeping their gates still closed for Serbian citizens, 
the EU continued placing conditions on the country’s fragile government. The 
crucial turning point occurred in March 2003. At this time, the assassination of 
Zoran Đinđić allowed EU critics to regain power in Serbia; as a consequence, 
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the commitment toward Serbia’s EU integration was at least temporarily lost. 
While the governments led by Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica between 2004 
and 2008 did not completely cease cooperation with the EU, they also did not 
share the unconditional commitment held by the first Serbian democratic 
government. The requirements
3 for building closer ties with the EU were not 
considered a priority, but instead a focus was placed on Serbia’s territorial 
integrity.
4 The negligence of the cooperation with the ICTY was one of the main 
reasons why Serbia did not receive a positive Feasibility Study until spring 
2005.
5 A few months later, in October 2005 the EU officially opened the 
negotiations for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). These 
negotiations were halted in May of 2006 due to Serbia’s persistent lack of 
cooperation with the ICTY. This turn of events marked a new decline in the 
relationship between Belgrade and Brussels. While the EU visa regime for 
Serbian citizens was still in place, additional confrontation transpired. This 
friction was related to the referendum for independence in Montenegro as well 
as the possible independence of Kosovo. Both situations, according to the 
Serbian government, were backed by Brussels. 
The relations between Serbia and the EU improved again in February 
2007 following parliamentary elections in Serbia and the victory of president 
Tadić’s Democratic Party (DP). Prime Minister Koštunica again led the 
government formed in May 2007, however the majority of the ministers (and 
hence votes) belonged to DP and G17+, which had a clear EU commitment. This 
was a primary reason why Brussels showed readiness to resume SAA 
negotiations, which did take place in June 2007. Conditions remained 
unchanged: Serbia was responsible for developing and improving the necessary 
legislative framework and administrative capacity to satisfy its obligations under 
the Agreement and to fully cooperate with the ICTY. Although by September 
2007 the Serbian administration managed to finalize the SAA negotiations, the 
EU rejected to sign it without the ICTY’s full cooperation
6. This was especially 
limited during PM Koštunica’s second term- practically suspended.  
This situation changed in April 2008, shortly before the snap 
Parliamentary elections in Serbia. The EU decided to loosen its condition for the 
SAA related to Serbia´s cooperation with the ICTY. Previously Serbia and the 
EU were nearing another slow-down in their relations, because a majority of EU 
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member states recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 
2008. Additionally, PM Koštunica called for a reconsideration not just of the 
SAA between Serbia and the EU, but a general reconsideration of Serbia’s EU 
accession without Kosovo. The dispute concerning Kosovo led to a government 
crisis. PM Koštunica resisted signing the SAA without getting a guarantee from 
Brussels that Kosovo would be considered an inseparable part of Serbia. DP and 
G17+ considered the SAA not only unrelated to Kosovo, but also believed that 
by signing the SAA, Serbia would have a better starting point to protect its 
interests related to the province of Kosovo. Since the government coalition could 
not agree, new elections were scheduled. Like many others before, these 
elections were again seen as an informal referendum for and against the EU. 
At a time when on the one hand even strong EU supporters in Serbia had 
difficulties in agreeing on and supporting the EU policy towards Kosovo, and on 
the other hand the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia led 
a very anti-European campaign, Brussels realised that it had to send a supportive 
message to the citizens of Serbia. With this in mind the EU decided, under the 
leadership of Slovenia and despite the restraints from the Netherlands , to sign 
the SAA with Serbia in April 2008. This took place despite Serbia’s unsatisfying 
cooperation with the ICTY. Synchronously, Brussels presented a roadmap with 
specific benchmarks required of Serbia in order to advance toward visa 
liberalisation.
7 Both measures proved to be fruitful: the voters in Serbia clearly 
recognized Brussels’ good intentions.
8 As a result, those parties which were in 
favour of signing the SAA (the coalition “For a European Serbia” and LDP) 
achieved success in the elections.
9 This success was qualified: these parties 
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failed to receive sufficient votes to form a government of their own. 
Consequently the leading parties of the coalition, DP and G17+, were compelled 
to negotiate with the coalition led by SPS. Finally in July 2008 a new 
government was formed, and according to the Coalition agreement, all parties 
are united in their commitment to Serbia’s EU integration.
10 
Current State of Affairs. Although positive conditions exist for the new pro-
European government in Serbia to bring the nation much closer to the EU, it will 
have to face a number of serious obstacles in the next four years. The last eight 
years have seen Serbia miss many opportunities to take the fast-track to 
Brussels: a result of problems internal to Serbia as well as the dynamic 
conditions within the EU. The interrelatedness of these issues have compounded 
the problem: as circumstances within Serbia worsened, the less the EU was 
capable of aiding Serbia in extricating itself from those circumstances. This 
paper will first analyse the current state of affairs of Serbia’s EU integration 
process, and then discuss the main internal and external problems Serbia is 
currently facing in this process.  
   Technical issues. As mentioned above, Serbia has technically met all 
requirements for signing the SAA. The ratification by all EU member states 
however is currently postponed until Serbia’s full cooperation with the ICTY has 
been gained. This cooperation is likely to eventually lead to the arrest and 
transfer of two remaining fugitives, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, to The 
Hague. Serbia has in June and July 2008 made important steps by arresting and 
extraditing Bosnian Serb Stojan Župljanin and former Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadžić, who were two of the four last war crime suspects. The arrest 
of Karadžić in particular might result in the ratification of the SAA by some EU 
member states, despite the fact that Mladić and Hadžić are still in flight. Some 
will perceive this action as a clear demonstration of the new Serbian 
government's political will to cooperate with the ICTY. 
In regard to Serbia’s political criteria and reforms, the last EU Progress 
Report on the nation from November 2007
11 has confirmed that progress has 
occured. This progress took place despite sharp political divisions. Nevertheless, 
during the former government the reform process in regard to the civilian 
oversight of the military improved, while Serbia has played a positive role in 
improving regional cooperation. Judicial reform, on the other hand, is lagging 
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behind and a new legal framework is pending, while corruption still is 
widespread.  
In regard to economic reforms, more efforts are needed to enable Serbia 
to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. This 
reform must take place in the relatively near future, however the broad economic 
policy essentials have remained intact. Serbia’s economy continued its 
expansion at a swift pace while foreign capital inflows remained significant.
12 
Although inflation increased in 2008 compared to past years, this can be 
considered a consequence of the internal political instability and the uncertainty 
before and after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Providing that the 
political situation remains stable, it can be expected that the inflation will again 
decline and that expenditures will again be directed more toward investment 
during the coming year. This phenomenon is expected to be mirrored in Serbia’s 
foreign trade and investment; these declined during the first half of 2008 and are 
now expected to resume growing once the new government begins operating. 
Progress Reports have largely reflected the advancement of Serbia’s economic 
integration with the EU.
13 Difficulties regarding unemployment persist. These 
high figures reflect the need for further privatisation and the full establishment 
of a competitive and dynamic private sector. The inflexibility of the labour 
market combined with high social security contributions represent an obstacle 
for job creation: not dissimilar to bureaucratic requirements and complex 
legislation.
14  
Generally, Serbia has shown that it has the administrative capacity to 
progress toward the EU. To this end, Serbia has been working on a draft of a 
(the?) „National Programme for the EU Integration of Serbia“ (NPI)
15 which is 
based on a consensus of all ministers and ministries. The Serbian government 
adopted the program in June 2008.
16 This draft is expected to be discussed in 
public before its adoption by the new Serbian government and parliament by the 
end of summer 2008.
17 It has been written in accord with the Copenhagen 
criteria and contains a detailed plan for fulfilling all EU membership criteria. 
Economic and political conditions are addressed, as is the adoption of laws; the 
program also addresses the most specific EU standards in trade, agriculture, 
environmental protection and infrastructure. The aim of Serbia’s NPI, a 
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document which has so far only been prepared by countries after acquiring 
candidate status, is to demonstrate that Serbia’s advanced administrative 
capacities are far more advanced than the country’s formal status with the EU. 
The NPI is expected to provide evidence that Serbia is well prepared to begin 
integration negotiations and thereby confirming the country’s intention to 
acquire candidate status. Serbia seeks to gain this status by the end of 2008, 




Internal and Regional Problems. Serbia’s commitment to progress its EU 
integration process does not depend solely on its determination to do so. Serbia 
is facing security problems which are related to the fact that lasting peace has 
not been achieved.
19 Threats of internal as well as external conflicts (Serbia-
Kosovo) linger, and will persist until the Kosovo issue remains unresolved to the 
satisfaction of Serbia. The EU is limited in its capacity to aid in acquiring a 
resolution as a result of the divergent perspectives on the issue among its 
member nations. The EU has consequently avoided the matter; until it is 
addressed, Serbia will be exposed to these security risks.  
Serbia is also confronted with regional political risks that endanger the 
EU integration process. These political risks are related to the fact that both 
Serbia and its neighbours must still settle as states. Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo are still lacking a consolidated 
society and state; At the same time all are being confronted with deep ethnical, 
social and economic divisions. Here again the EU has so far been unable to cope 
with the crucial problems.
20  
Serbia also is facing serious economic risks, especially in regard to the 
labour market and macroeconomic stability. Here again, the EU’s ability to aid 
in stabilizing the economy is restricted, since investments and economic 
development depend mostly on political stability. 
Regional cooperation is a fundamental aspect of Serbia’s EU integration. 
This cooperation has been greatly endangered by Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence as well as the recognition of this declaration by Serbia’s 
neighbours. Serbia has already undermined decisions made at regional summits 
and meetings when Kosovo was represented as an independent state. It can be 
said that the current declining or at least stalled regional cooperation within the 
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SEEC is the first and most important collateral damage of Kosovo’s 
independence. In this case the EU again has no ability to act as a facilitator but 
can only hope that the Serbian government will change its policy toward 
Kosovo. This change however will take at the very least one or two years, and 
certainly not before Serbian citizens achieve a better standard of living. Nor will 
the policy shift take place before Serbia’s EU integration process makes 
significant headway: at least to the point of achieving candidate status and full 
visa liberation. It is likely that the Serbian political elites and citizens will be 
inclined to accept Kosovo’s independence only after obtaining EU advantages or 
gaining an EU perspective.  
 
External Problems. In addition to the internal problems aggravating Serbia’s EU 
integration process, there have been a number of external circumstances 
exaserbating the situation as well. The EU is no longer the institution that it was 
in 1989, nor is it the same as in the 1990s or even at the beginning of this 
century. Although the EU has grown in size and strength, it has also to some 
extent become weaker in regard to its absorption capacity. After ten new states 
joined the EU in 2004, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the EU 
began to show its first signs of fatigue. While this expansion transformed 
Brussels into a geostrategical and economical global player, it produced 
problems on another level. Although these new problems (fear of immigration, 
increasing unemployment) are not only a result of the enlargement, but are also a 
consequence of a global recession: the elites and citizens of the EU member 
states, in particular those of the old member states, began to call for an 
expansion freeze until the EU reconsolidates. This issue was first discussed after 
the referendum in France and the Netherlands, where the majority of the 
population refused the Treaty of Nice; it is again at the top of Brussels agenda 
since a majority in Ireland refused the Lisbon Reform treaty in June 2008. 
Although no official decision has been made in Brussels following the Irish 
referendum in regard to the future of EU enlargement, several high-ranking 
politicians (French president Nicolas Sárkozy being the first) have announced 
that the next EU enlargement will not take place before the Lisbon treaty is not 
ratified by all member states. This makes uncertain the date of the next 
enlargement and hence a strong and clear EU commitment towards the Western 
Balkans remains uncertain as well. Taking this into account, the former German 
foreign minister Joschka Fischer fears that after the Irish referendum the process 
of enlargement could not merely be delayed, but even halted altogether. His 
sentiments are based on the fact that the EU can no longer accept new member 
states on the basis of the Treaty of Nice. This would reflect on the Western Serbia’s EU Integration Process: The Momentum of 2008 
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Balkans as well.
21 Apart from the (whether temporarily or permanently) stalled 
Lisbon treaty due to the referendum in Ireland, France introduced in July 2008 a 
constitution reform that foresees a referendum for every new EU member; this 
makes the EU future of the Western Balkans even more uncertain. 
Considering all these internal and external factors present in the current 
state of affairs, it is apparent that Serbia has lost many opportunities over the last 
15 years. Today there are much more obstacles for an EU membership than a 
decade ago, or even in 2000 when Serbia had its first chance at becoming a 
member state. Despite these factors, and despite the diverse risks now facing 
Serbia that could possibly prolong its EU integration process even further, the 
Parliamentary election results in May are a reason for hope. The pro-European 
parties did not get more than 50% of the votes, however they nevertheless made 
significant gains. The EU orientation of the Serbian citizens had never before 
been so widespread. In this regard there is a kind of momentum in Serbia that 
could enable the nation to not merely catch up with Croatia and Macedonia, but 
also to act as a stabilizer in the region. It is for this reason that this momentum 
should be used both in Belgrade and Brussels. At the same time however, the 
EU is currently facing developments, which some may even characterize as 
crises, that currently have the potential to hinder Serbia’s prospects for gaining 
EU membership. In its direst form, this situation could wipe away the gains 
made in Serbia. The following part of this article will discuss how both Serbia 
and the EU can avoid the mistakes made between 2000 and 2008
22 and how to 
minimize the potential dangers in regard to Serbia’s EU perspective. 
 
 
3. Alternatives to the Current State of Affairs 
 
Serbia’s policies. In general, there is thus far no doubt that the new government 
is committed to Serbia’s EU integration
23, having a realistic perspective to 
acquire candidate status within its first year. In this regard it will be necessary 
for the new constituted parliament to ratify the SAA and the NPI as Serbia’s 
road map to the EU. This however means that the new government will need to 
be resolute in finalizing the cooperation with the ICTY. This issue will be the 
first and perhaps only, and certainly the most important, stumbling block for the 
new coalition because SPS will have to show its readiness to support the arrest 
and extradition of the last two fugitives to The Hague. The arrest of Radovan 
                                                           
21  Fischer, Joschka. 2008. “Eselsohren als Leitsymbol für die Fortführung der europäischen 
Integration?“ Der Standard, June 23. 
22 Especially until 2003, when Serbia had a strongly EU-committed government led by Zoran 
Đinđić. 
23  Cvetković, Mirko. 2008 Report of the new Serbian Prime Minister on July 8, 2008. 
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vlada/ (accessed August 22, 2008) Irena Ristić 
  120 
Karadžić in July 2008 however confirms that SPS accepts the cooperation with 
the ITCY as an international obligation that Serbia must fulfill. Equally 
important as the ratification of the SAA and the cooperation with the ICTY is 
the fact that Serbia must continue executing reforms throughout the entire 
system.  
As long as the new Serbian government carries out its obligations in 
observing international conditions related to its EU integration process, there is 
no need to modify its current policies. Adjustments or changes in regard to 
Kosovo will however likely need performed in the coming years. While this 
policy is not directly related to the EU integration, it doubtlessly has an impact 
on the process. Currently, Serbia’s new government is not merely committed to 
the nation’s EU integration, but also determined to have Kosovo considered as 
an inseparable part of Serbia and rejecting Kosovo’s ever being recognized as an 
independent state.
24 Since all coalition partners share this perspective, a change 
of this view would mean a break-up of the coalition. As a result it is highly 
unlikely that this policy toward Kosovo will change within the next few years. 
Considering these facts, it cannot be expected that the region will see political 
and economic stabilization and utter peace in the near future. This may diminish 
the likelihood of the region (apart from Croatia) becoming closer to obtaining 
EU status. 
The crucial remaining question is determining under which conditions 
Serbia would change its policies toward Kosovo in the long-term. This question 
involves many contingencies, as there are too many actors with too many 
unclear positions. First, there is the Serbian political elite, of which a majority is 
(at least officially) resolute in rejecting the independence of Kosovo. Second, 
there is the Serbian population which also is not in favour of an independent 
Kosovo. It is however not possible to foresee how the Serbian population would 
react in the event of some Serbian political elites and parties (if any were to do 
so, they would most likely be LDP and G17+) decide to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence as a precondition for Serbia’s EU membership. In a worst case 
scenario, the citizens of Serbia would turn again to the SRS and DPS, which 
would likely cause Serbia to drift from the EU. In a best case scenario, the 
citizens of Serbia would accept and support the decision of the elites, believing 
that the EU access is more important than Kosovo. This best case scenario 
however can not be expected before the citizens of Serbia experience the 
advantages of being part of an EU candidate state. Paramount among these 
advantages would be the opportunity to travel without visas, to gain access to 
student exchange programmes, and to obtain better trade conditions with the EU 
and as a consequence to experience a higher standard of living. There is a third 
actor: the EU, which expresses an unclear position toward Kosovo as well. 
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While so far 21 EU countries have recognized Kosovo’s independence, there are 
six which have not. It is currently unknown whether the EU will force Serbia to 
recognize Kosovo’s independence once it applies for candidacy to become a full 
member state. Further, it is unknown whether Brussels could set such a 
condition, since it is highly unlikely that a consensus could currently be achieved 
in this matter. Brussels’ unclear position toward Serbia’s recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence creates an additional variable in predicting whether the 
elites and citizens of Serbia would today opt for EU or for Kosovo.  
EU policies. After having discussed the Serbian policies towards the 
EU, this section of the paper will discuss alternatives to three EU policies which 
have been discussed above: first, the EU access policy for the Western Balkans, 
second, the EU visa policy, and finally the EU Kosovo policy. 
EU access policy for the Western Balkans. As discussed above, the EU 
has never provided Serbia a clear perspective in regard to an EU membership. 
Moreover, by maintaining the visa regime, Brussels has sent, to an extent , a 
contradictory message. This of course has various reasons, which have been 
elaborated above. It cannot be neglected that Serbia, especially after March 
2003, has not done nearly enough in order to claim the right for a clear EU 
perspective. On the other hand, the EU decision in April 2008 to sign the SAA 
with Serbia, despite the fact that the cooperation with the ICTY was not 
satisfactory, demonstrated the potential positive impact of providing even a 
vague perspective. However, it is obvious that the EU enthusiasm in Serbia 
would, or at least could, diminish if the EU decides to postpone their perspective 
of the Western Balkans due to the Irish referendum. This would once again 
make the EU integration of Serbia uncertain. Such a position from the EU is of 
course a result of an uncertainty within the EU itself and a consequence of the 
viewpoint that- for a majority of EU citizens - the EU enlargement is expanding 
too quickly. In this regard many EU citizens fear immigration and an economic 
risk for their own countries and their own standard of living. While it is quite 
understandable that politicians from EU countries must consider these fears of 
their citizens and to attempt to calm them, it is perhaps not the optimal solution 
to do so by interrupting (or merely announcing an interruption of) the EU 
integration of the Western Balkans. This is especially the case because in a long-
term perspective these fears will possibly disappear in the event that the Western 
Balkans become integrated into the EU. In this case the region would become 
pacified; this pacification would diminish the danger of immigration and 
economic instability for both the Western Balkans and the EU.  
EU visa policy. Closely related to the EU access policy is the EU visa 
policy. To some extent, the advantages of lifting the visa regime are greater for 
the EU- at least in the long-term. An unrestricted EU would immeasurably 
increase the support for the EU among the majority of the Serbian population. 
This would make inevitable the acceptance of a Serbian integration into the EU. Irena Ristić 
  122 
The likelihood of a massive stream of Serbian citizens to EU countries is very 
remote. The current EU policy regarding visa applications for a number of 
citizens such as pupils, students, scientists, artist etc. have experienced little 
success. On one hand these categories represent only a small minority of the 
population; on the other hand, even these categories of citizens must fulfill a 
number of conditions in addition to performing the usual procedures. As 
described above, the EU in May 2008 created explicit conditions for the full visa 
liberalization of Serbian citizens. Although these conditions still leave room for 
interpretation and there is still no guarantee that fulfilment of these conditions 
will definitely lead to the abolition of the visa requirements, there is at least a 
more defined direction. 
EU policy towards Kosovo. The current EU policy on Kosovo does not 
foresee a unique position; hence, the first step might be to define an alternative 
to this policy and make a clear statement regarding this issue. It is still unclear 
whether the SAA and any future EU contracts consider Serbia with or without 
Kosovo as its integral part; it is also uncertain whether the EU will qualify 
Serbia’s EU membership with the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. 
Further alternatives to the EU Kosovo policy would depend on this decision. 
Because it is unlikely that the EU can obtain a single, unified standpoint toward 
the Kosovo issue, there remains two possible scenarios. If the EU decides to 
recognize Kosovo and negotiate with Serbia apart from Kosovo, it could lead to 
a government crisis and a decline of EU support in Serbia. In order to prevent 
this, the EU would have to– before announcing that Kosovo is officially no 
longer considered a part of Serbia– offer a very concrete membership 
perspective to Serbia and its citizens. Even then it could not be guaranteed that 
such a decision would not lead to a government crisis in Serbia and new 
elections. Alternatively, the EU could continue negotiating with Serbia including 
Kosovo under the UNSCR 1244. In this case, the Serbian government would be 
more likely to remain stable and support of the EU within Serbia would 






During the past nearly twenty years, Serbia has been invariably late: late in 
recognizing the spirit of change in 1989, late in reacting to Milošević’s 
devastating policies, late in seeing the reality in Kosovo, late in accepting the 
cooperation with The Hague as a conditional sine qua non, late in defining the 
EU integration as the highest priority and hence late in conducting absolutely 
necessary reforms. At the same time the EU was constantly more than just a 
neutral observer, becoming already a part of the problem during the first genesis Serbia’s EU Integration Process: The Momentum of 2008 
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and development of the crisis in former Yugoslavia; therefore the EU should 
also be a part of the final solution for this region.
25 While the strict EU policy 
toward Serbia until 2000 was to some extent understandable (although not quite 
effective), there is no rational explanation for Brussels’s’ lack of sensitivity for 
Serbia after 2000. During the government of Zoran Đinđić, no concrete EU 
stance was given. During this time, the very strict visa regime remained despite 
the fact that it had been introduced as part of sanctions against the regime of 
Slobodan Milošević. Being in a post-authoritarian and post-war/conflict 
atmosphere, with many reservations toward the so-called West throughout the 
population, and confronted with internal and dividing discussions on Serbia’s 
EU orientation, the first government desperately needed much more support 
from Brussels than it has received. With the assassination of Prime Minister 
Đinđić, any possible momentum during the first democratic government was 
unquestionably lost. This could have been used to strengthen Serbia’s EU 
orientation. The two following governments led by PM Koštunica resulted in 
another decline in Serbia’s EU integration. Brussels itself acted passive in 
accordance with a „wait and see“-policy, being at the same time insensitive to 
the situation in Serbia. There was also a lack of noticing on Brussels’ part that 
the demanding attitude (which in countries with an established consensus on the 
EU integration policy might be used as leverage) combined with the populism of 
Serbian nationalist politicians led to an increased anti-EU atmosphere 
throughout the nation. The creation of this negative attitude was certainly not the 
intention of the EU, but was nevertheless the result of the EU policy toward 
Serbia. Therefore the EU policy towrds Serbia in this period could be described 
as „too little, too late, too cheap.“ 
The new Serbian government formed in July 2008 has ushered in a new 
momentum in Belgrade. Simultaneously, the Slovenian EU Presidency during 
the first half of 2008 attempted to create in Brussels a greater awareness of the 
Western Balkans. In this regard it is more than evident that this chance must be 
used both by Belgrade and Brussels: while the EU must recognize the current 
positive circumstances in Serbia and be proactive and open, Serbia must be 
determined in fulfilling its obligations, especially the obligation to the ICTY. 
Resultantly, both Belgrade and Brussels must send a political signal by defining 
the EU membership of Serbia (Western Balkans) as unquestionable and as a 
priority.
26  
The EU integration of Serbia does not depend only on internal policies 
and economic reforms on one side and the internal developments within the EU 
itself on the other. It depends also on the solution of complex regional problems, 
most of all the Kosovo matter. In order to prevent this issue from occurring 
                                                           
25 Lopandić, Duško. 2007, p.85. 
26 Serbia should even define it as it highest priority. Irena Ristić 
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again and becoming a burden for the relations of Brussels and Belgrade, the EU 
should focus more on the integration and stabilization, instead of insisting on the 
recognition of Kosovo by both Serbia and the remaining EU member states that 
did not recognize Kosovo’s independence so far. In this regard it is also 
somewhat counterproductive to pressure neighbouring countries to recognize 
Kosovo, as it only creates friction.
27 On the contrary, preconditions for Serbia 
related to Kosovo should be precluded from negotiations during the next period. 
Instead, the focus should be directed toward unconditional integration, except 
those conditions upon which all parties agree: cooperation with the ICTY and 
internal reforms. In the case of Serbia not meeting these conditions, the EU 
should not return to a „wait and see“ policy, but instead be proactive and lead 
structured negotiations that would contribute to a transformation of the public 
will toward the EU. This action would advance the integration process in the 
event of it becoming stalled. The formula should not be “recognition of Kosovo 
first, followed by EU integration“, but instead “EU integration trust-
building/peace achievement“ after which the status of Kosovo will likely 
become less relevant.  
Many mishaps have occurred in Serbia during the past two decades. 
Serbia, its political elites and citizens, are naturally the first ones to be held 
responsible. The nation was, and still is, paying a high price for these mishaps- 
the belated EU integration being only one part of this price. Serbia must play 
catch-up in many aspects, and it will be essential to gain the EU’s assistance. 
This country is experiencing a double handicap: it is not merely late in executing 
necessary reforms; it has also experienced the longest authoritarian rule in the 
region in addition to suffering defeat after defeat.
28 For these latter reasons 
Serbian society maintains a potential for harbouring anti-Western/EU 
resentments. In this regard, Serbia needs support not primarily in order to 
become an EU member, but most of all to modernize itself and hence to 
integrate into the European society and the world economy. Not of least 
importance, Serbia still has a detrimental capacity to destabilize the region. For 
this reason, the EU integration of Serbia, which would permanently pacify the 








                                                           
27 This became obvious in Ocotber 2008, when Montenegro and Macedonia recognized Kosovo, 
provoking a harsh diplomatic reaction by Serbia.  
28 The lost of Kosovo being just the last one. Serbia’s EU Integration Process: The Momentum of 2008 
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